Comentario previo
He decidido no realizar la traducción del texto original en pos de conservar la gramatica, sintaxis y terminológia que hacen al espíritu del autor.
Para RECONSTRUYENDO EL PENSAMIENTO por Darío Yancán
Manifestation
01. There is a double spooking the world, the double of abstraction. The fortunes of states and armies, companies and communities depend on it. All contending classes - the landlords and farmers, the workers and capitalists - revere yet fear the relentless abstraction of the world on which their fortunes yet depend. All the classes but one. The hacker class.
02. Whatever code we hack, be it programming language, poetic language, math or music, curves or colourings, we create the possibility of new things entering the world. Not always great things, or even good things, but new things. In art, in science, in philosophy and culture, in any production of knowledge where data can be gathered, where information can be extracted from it, and where in that information new possibilities for the world are produced, there are hackers hacking the new out of the old. While hackers create these new worlds, we do not possess them. That which we create is mortgaged to others, and to the interests of others, to states and corporations who control the means for making worlds we alone discover. We do not own what we produce - it owns us.
03. And yet we don't quite know who we are. While we recognise our distinctive existence as a group, as programmers, as artists or writers or scientists or musicians, we rarely see these ways of representing ourselves as mere fragments of a class experience that is still struggling to express itself as itself, as expressions of the process of producing abstraction in the world. Geeks and freaks become what they are negatively, through their exclusion by others. Hackers are a class, but an abstract class, a class as yet to hack itself into manifest existence as itself.
Abstraction
04. Abstraction may be discovered or produced, may be material or immaterial, but abstraction is what every hack produces and affirms. To abstract is to construct a plane upon which otherwise different and unrelated matters may be brought into many possible relations. It is through the abstract that the virtual is identified, produced and released. The virtual is not just the potential latent in matters, it is the potential of potential. To hack is to produce or apply the abstract to information and express the possibility of new worlds.
05. All abstractions are abstractions of nature. To abstract is to express the virtuality of nature, to make known some instance of its manifold possibilities, to actualise a relation out of infinite relationality. Abstractions release the potential of physical matter. And yet abstraction relies on something that has an independent existence to physical matter -- information. Information is no less real than physical matter, and is dependent on it for its existence. Since information cannot exist in a pure, immaterial form, neither can the hacker class. Of necessity it must deal with a ruling class that owns the material means of extracting or distributing information, or with a producing class that extracts and distributes. The class interest of hackers lies in freeing information from its material constraints.
06. As the abstraction of private property was extended to information, it produced the hacker class as a class. Hackers must sell their capacity for abstraction to a class that owns the means of production, the vectoralist class - the emergent ruling class of our time. The vectorialist class is waging an intensive struggle to dispossess hackers of their intellectual property. Patents and copyrights all end up in the hands, not of their creators, but of the vectoralist class that owns the means of realising the value of these abstractions. The vectoralist class struggles to monopolise abstraction. Hackers find themselves dispossessed both individually, and as a class. Hackers come piecemeal to struggle against the particular forms in which abstraction is commodified and made into the private property of the vectoralist class. Hackers come to struggle collectively against the usurious charges the vectoralists extort for access to the information that hackers collectively produce, but that vectoralists collectively come to own. Hackers come as a class to recognise their class interest is best expressed through the struggle to free the production of abstraction not just from the particular fetters of this or that form of property, but to abstract the form of property itself.
07. What makes our times different is that what now appears on the horizon is the possibility of a society finally set free from necessity, both real and imagined, by an explosion in abstract innovations. Abstraction with the potential once and for all to break the shackles holding hacking fast to outdated and regressive class interests. The time is past due when hackers must come together with all of the producing classes of the world - to liberate productive and inventive resources from the myth of scarcity. "The world already possesses the dream of a time whose consciousness it must now possess in order to actually live it."
Production
08. Production produces all things, and all producers of things. Production produces not only the object of the production process, but also the producer as subject. Hacking is the production of production. The hack produces a production of a new kind, which has as its result a singular and unique product, and a singular and unique producer. Every hacker is at one and the same time producer and product of the hack, and emerges in its singularity as the memory of the hack as process.
09. Production takes place on the basis of a prior hack which gives to production its formal, social, repeatable and reproducible form. Every production is a hack formalised and repeated on the basis of its representation. To produce is to repeat; to hack, to differentiate.
10. The hack produces both a useful and a useless surplus, although the usefulness of any surplus is socially and historically determined. The useful surplus goes into expanding the realm of freedom wrested from necessity. The useless surplus is the surplus of freedom itself, the margin of free production unconstrained by production for necessity.
11. The production of a surplus creates the possibility of the expansion of freedom from necessity. But in class society, the production of a surplus also creates new necessities. Class domination takes the form of the capture of the productive potential of society and its harnessing to the production, not of liberty, but of class domination itself. The ruling class subordinates the hack to the production of forms of production that may be harnessed to the enhancement of class power, and the suppression or marginalisation of other forms of hacking. What the producing classes - farmers, workers and hackers - have in common is an interest in freeing production from its subordination to ruling classes who turn production into the production of new necessities, who wrest slavery from surplus. The elements of a free productivity exist already in an atomised form, in the productive classes. What remains is the release of its virtuality.
Class
12. The class struggle, in its endless setbacks, reversals and compromises returns again and again to the unanswered question - property - and the contending classes return again and again with new answers. The working class questioned the necessity of private property, and the communist party arose, claiming to answer the desires of the working class. The answer, expressed in the Communist Manifesto was to "centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state." But making the state the monopolist of property has only produced a new ruling class, and a new and more brutal class struggle. But perhaps this was not the final answer, and the course of the class struggle is not yet over. Perhaps there is another class that can pose the property question in a new way - and offer new answers to breaking the monopoly of the ruling classes on property.
13. There is a class dynamic driving each stage of the development of the vectoral world in which we now find ourselves. The pastoralist class disperse the great mass of peasants who traditionally worked the land under the thumb of feudal landlords. The pastoralists supplant the feudal landlords, releasing the productivity of the land which they claim as their private property. As new forms of abstraction make it possible to produce a surplus from the land with fewer and fewer farmers, pastoralists turn them off their land, depriving them of their living. Dispossessed farmers seek work and a new home in cities. Here farmers become workers, as capital puts them to work in its factories. Capital as property gives rise to a class of capitalists who own the means of production, and a class of workers, dispossessed of it - and by it. Dispossessed farmers become workers, only to be dispossessed again. Having lost their land, they lose in turn their culture. Capital produces in its factories not just the necessities of existence, but a way of life it expects its workers to consume. Commodified life dispossess the worker of the information traditionally passed on outside the realm of private property as culture, as the gift of one generation to the next, and replaces it with information in commodified form.
14. Information, like land or capital, becomes a form of property monopolised by a class of vectoralists, so named because they control the vectors along which information is abstracted, just as capitalists control the material means with which goods are produced, and pastoralists the land with which food is produced. Information circulated within working class culture as a social property belonging to all. But when information in turn becomes a form of private property, workers are dispossessed of it, and must buy their own culture back from its owners, the vectoralist class. The whole of time, time itself, becomes a commodified experience.
15. Vectoralists try to break capital's monopoly on the production process, and subordinate the production of goods to the circulation of information. The leading corporations divest themselves of their productive capacity, as this is no longer a source of power. Their power lies in monopolising intellectual property - patents and brands - and the means of reproducing their value - the vectors of communication. The privatisation of information becomes the dominant, rather than a subsidiary, aspect of commodified life. As private property advances from land to capital to information, property itself becomes more abstract. As capital frees land from its spatial fixity, information as property frees capital from its fixity in a particular object.
16. The hacker class, producer of new abstractions, becomes more important to each successive ruling class, as each depends more and more on information as a resource. The hacker class arises out of the transformation of information into property, in the form of intellectual property, including patents, trademarks, copyright and the moral right of authors. The hacker class is the class with the capacity to create not only new kinds of object and subject in the world, not only new kinds of property form in which they may be represented, but new kinds of relation beyond the property form. The formation of the hacker class as a class comes at just this moment when freedom from necessity and from class domination appears on the horizon as a possibility.
Property
17. Property constitutes an abstract plane upon which all things may be things with one quality in common, the quality of property. Land is the primary form of property. Pastoralists acquire land as private property through the forced dispossession of peasants who once shared a portion of it in a form of public ownership. Capital is the secondary form of property, the privatisation of productive assets in the form of tools, machines and working materials. Capital, unlike land, is not in fixed supply or disposition. It can be made and remade, moved, aggregated and dispersed. An infinitely greater degree of potential can be released from the world as a productive resource once the abstract plane of property includes both land and capital - such is capital's 'advance'.
18. The capitalist class recognises the value of the hack in the abstract, whereas the pastoralists were slow to appreciate the productivity that can flow from the application of abstraction to the production process. Under the influence of capital, the state sanctions forms of intellectual property, such as patents and copyrights, that secure an independent existence for hackers as a class, and a flow of innovations in culture as well as science from which development issues. Information, once it becomes a form of property, develops beyond a mere support for capital - it becomes the basis of a form of accumulation in its own right.
19. Hackers must calculate their interests not as owners, but as producers, for this is what distinguishes them from the vectoralist class. Hackers do not merely own, and profit by owning information. They produce new information, and as producers need access to it free from the absolute domination of the commodity form. Hacking as a pure, free experimental activity must be free from any constraint that is not self imposed. Only out of its liberty will it produce the means of producing a surplus of liberty and liberty as a surplus.
20. Private property arose in opposition not only to feudal property, but also to traditional forms of the gift economy, which were a fetter to the increased productivity of the commodity economy. Qualitative, gift exchange was superseded by quantified, monetised exchange. Money is the medium through which land, capital, information and labour all confront each other as abstract entities, reduced to an abstract plane of measurement. The gift becomes a marginal form of property, everywhere invaded by the commodity, and turned towards mere consumption. The gift is marginal, but nevertheless plays a vital role in cementing reciprocal and communal relations among people who otherwise can only confront each other as buyer and sellers of commodities. As vectoral production develops, the means appear for the renewal of the gift economy. Everywhere that the vector reaches, it brings into the orbit of the commodity. But everywhere the vector reaches, it also brings with it the possibility of the gift relation.
21. The hacker class has a close affinity with the gift economy. The hacker struggles to produce a subjectivity that is qualitative and singular, in part through the act of the hack itself. The gift, as a qualitative exchange between singular parties allows each party to be recognised as a singular producer, as a subject of production, rather than as a commodified and quantified object. The gift expresses in a social and collective way the subjectivity of the production of production, whereas commodified property represents the producer as an object, a quantifiable commodity like any other, of relative value only. The gift of information need not give rise to conflict over information as property, for information need not suffer the artifice of scarcity once freed from commodification.
22. The vectoralist class contributed, unwittingly, to the development of the vectoral space within which the gift as property could return, but quickly recognised its error. As the vectoral economy develops, less and less of it takes the form of a social space of open and free gift exchange, and more and more of it takes the form of commodified production for private sale. The vectoralist class can grudgingly accommodate some margin of socialised information, as the price it pays in a democracy for the furtherance of its main interests. But the vectoralist class quite rightly sees in the gift a challenge not just to its profits but to its very existence. The gift economy is the virtual proof for the parasitic and superfluous nature of vectoralists as a class.
Vector
23. In epidemiology, a vector is the particular means by which a given pathogen travels from one population to another. Water is a vector for cholera, bodily fluids for HIV. By extension, a vector may be any means by which information moves. Telegraph, telephone, television, telecommunications: these terms name not just particular vectors, but a general abstract capacity that they bring into the world and expand. All are forms of telesthesia, or perception at a distance. A given media vector has certain fixed properties of speed, bandwidth, scope and scale, but may be deployed anywhere, at least in principle. The uneven development of the vector is political and economic, not technical.
24. With the commodification of information comes its vectoralisation. Extracting a surplus from information requires technologies capable of transporting information through space, but also through time. The archive is a vector through time just as communication is a vector that crosses space. The vectoral class comes into its own once it is in possession of powerful technologies for vectoralising information. The vectoral class may commodify information stocks, flows, or vectors themselves. A stock of information is an archive, a body of information maintained through time that has enduring value. A flow of information is the capacity to extract information of temporary value out of events and to distribute it widely and quickly. A vector is the means of achieving either the temporal distribution of a stock, or the spatial distribution of a flow of information. Vectoral power is generally sought through the ownership of all three aspects.
25. The vectoral class ascend to the illusion of an instantaneous and global plane of calculation and control. But it is not the vectoralist class that comes to hold subjective power over the objective world. The vector itself usurps the subjective role, becoming the sole repository of will toward a world that can be apprehended only in its commodified form. The reign of the vector is one in which any and every thing can be apprehended as a thing. The vector is a power over all of the world, but a power that is not evenly distributed. Nothing in the technology of the vector determines its possible use. All that is determined by the technology is the form in which information is objectified.
26. The vectoral class struggles at every turn to maintain its subjective power over the vector, but as it continues to profit by the proliferation of the vector, some capacity over it always escapes control. In order to market and profit by the information it peddles over the vector, it must in some degree address the vast majority of the producing classes as subjects, rather than as objects of commodification. The hacker class seeks the liberation of the vector from the reign of the commodity, but not to set it indiscriminately free. Rather, to subject it to collective and democratic development. The hacker class can release the virtuality of the vector only in principle. It is up to an alliance of all the productive classes to turn that potential to actuality, to organise themselves subjectively, and use the available vectors for a collective and subjective becoming.
Education
27. Education is slavery, it enchains the mind and makes it a resource for class power. When the ruling class preaches the necessity of an education it invariably means an education in necessity. Education is not the same as knowledge. Nor is it the necessary means to acquire knowledge. Education is the organisation of knowledge within the constraints of scarcity. Education 'disciplines' knowledge, segregating it into homogenous 'fields', presided over by suitably 'qualified' guardians charged with policing the representation of the field. One may acquire an education, as if it were a thing, but one becomes knowledgeable, through a process of transformation. Knowledge, as such, is only ever partially captured by education, its practice always eludes and exceeds it.
28. The pastoralist class has resisted education, other than as indoctrination in obedience. When capital required 'hands' to do its dirty work, the bulk of education was devoted to training useful hands to tend the machines, and docile bodies who would accept as natural the social order in which they found themselves. When capital required brains, both to run its increasingly complex operations and to apply themselves to the work of consuming its products, more time spent in the prison house of education was required for admission to the ranks of the paid working class.
29. The so-called middle class achieve their privileged access to consumption and security through education, in which they are obliged to invest a substantial part of their income. But most remain workers, even though they work with information rather than cotton or metal. They work in factories, but are trained to think of them as offices. They take home wages, but are trained to think of it as a salary. They wear a uniform, but are trained to think of it as a suit. The only difference is that education has taught them to give different names to the instruments of exploitation, and to despise those their own class who name them differently.
30. Where the capitalist class sees education as a means to an end, the vectoralist class sees it as an end in itself. It sees opportunities to make education a profitable industry in its own right, based on the securing of intellectual property as a form of private property. To the vectoralists, education, like culture, is just 'content' for commodification.
31. The hacker class have an ambivalent relationship to education. The hacker class desires knowledge, not education. The hacker comes into being though the pure liberty of knowledge in and of itself. The hack expresses knowledge in its virtuality, by producing new abstractions that do not necessarily fit the disciplinary regime of managing and commodifying education. . Hacker knowledge implies, in its practice, a politics of free information, free learning, the gift of the result to a network of peers. Hacker knowledge also implies an ethics of knowledge subject to the claims of public interest and free from subordination to commodity production. This puts the hacker into an antagonistic relationship to the struggle of the capitalist class to make education an induction into wage slavery.
32. Only one intellectual conflict has any real bearing on the class issue for hackers: Whose property is knowledge? Is it the role of knowledge to authorise subjects through education that are recognised only by their function in an economy by manipulating its authorised representations as objects? Or is it the function of knowledge to produce the ever different phenomena of the hack, in which subjects become other than themselves, and discover the objective world to contain potentials other than it appears?
Hacking
33. The virtual is the true domain of the hacker. It is from the virtual that the hacker produces ever-new expressions of the actual. To the hacker, what is represented as being real is always partial, limited, perhaps even false. To the hacker there is always a surplus of possibility expressed in what is actual, the surplus of the virtual. This is the inexhaustible domain of what is real without being actual, what is not but which may be. To hack is to release the virtual into the actual, to express the difference of the real.
34. Through the application of abstraction, the hacker class produces the possibility of production, the possibility of making something of and with the world - and of living off the surplus produced by the application of abstraction to nature - to any nature. Through the production of new forms of abstraction, the hacker class produces the possibility of the future - not just 'the' future, but an infinite possible array of futures, the future itself as virtuality.
35. Under the sanction of law, the hack becomes a finite property, and the hacker class emerges, as all classes emerge, out of a relation to a property form. Like all forms of property, intellectual property enforces a relation of scarcity. It assigns a right to a property to an owner at the expense of non-owners, to a class of possessors at the expense of the dispossessed.
36. By its very nature, the act of hacking overcomes the limits property imposes on it. New hacks supersede old hacks, and devalues them as property. The hack as new information is produced out of already existing information. This gives the hacker class an interest in its free availability more than in an exclusive right. The immaterial nature of information means that the possession by one of information need not deprive another of it.
37. To the extent that the hack embodies itself in the form of property, it gives the hacker class interests quite different from other classes, be they exploiting or exploited classes. The interest of the hacker class lies first and foremost in a free circulation of information, this being the necessary condition for the renewed statement of the hack. But the hacker class as class also has an interest in the representation of the hack as property, as something from which a source of income may be derived that gives the hacker some independence from the ruling classes.
38. The very nature of the hack gives the hacker a crisis of identity. The hacker searches for a representation of what it is to be a hacker in the identities of other classes. Some see themselves as vectoralists, trading on the scarcity of their property. Some see themselves as workers, but as privileged ones in a hierarchy of wage earners. The hacker class has produces itself as itself, but not for itself. It does not (yet) possess a consciousness of its consciousness. It is not aware of its own virtuality. It has to distinguish between its competitive interest in the hack, and its collective interest in discovering a relation among hackers that expresses an open and ongoing future.
Information
39. Information wants to be free but is everywhere in chains. Information is the potential of potential. When unfettered it releases the latent capacities of all things and people, objects and subjects. Information is indeed the very potential for there to be objects and subjects. It is the medium in which objects and subjects actually come into existence, and is the medium in which their virtuality resides. When information is not free, then the class that owns or controls it turns its capacity toward its own interest and away from its own inherent virtuality.
40. Information has nothing to do with communication, or with media. "We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present." Information is precisely this resistance, this friction. At the urgings of the vectoralist class, the state recognises as property any communication, any media product with some minimal degree of difference recognisable in commodity exchange. Where communication merely requires the repetition of this commodified difference, information is the production of the difference of difference.
41. The arrest of the free flow of information means the enslavement of the world to the interests of those who profit from information's scarcity, the vectoral class. The enslavement of information means the enslavement of its producers to the interests of its owners. It is the hacker class that taps the virtuality of information, but it is the vectoralist class that owns and controls the means of production of information on an industrial scale. Privatising culture, education and communication as commodified content, distorts and deforms its free development, and prevents the very concept of its freedom from its own free development. While information remains subordinated to ownership, it is not possible for its producers to freely calculate their interests, or to discover what the true freedom of information might potentially produce in the world.
42. Free information must be free in all its aspects - as a stock, as a flow, and as a vector. The stock of information is the raw material out of which history is abstracted. The flow of information is the raw material out of which the present is abstracted, a present that forms the horizon the abstract line of an historical knowledge crosses, indicating a future in its sights. Neither stocks nor flows of information exist without vectors along which they may be actualised. The spatial and temporal axes of free information must do more offer a representation of things, as a thing apart. They must become the means of coordination of the statement of a movement, at once objective and subjective, capable of connecting the objective representation of things to the presentation of a subjective action.
43. It is not just information that must be free, but the knowledge of how to use it. Information in itself is a mere thing. It requires an active, subjective capacity to become productive. Information is free not for the purpose of representing the world perfectly, but for expressing its difference from what is, and for expressing the cooperative force that transforms what is into what may be. The test of a free society is not the liberty to consume information, nor to produce it, nor even to implement its potential in private world of one's choosing. The test of a free society is the liberty for the collective transformation of the world through abstractions freely chosen and freely actualised.
Representation
44. All representation is false. A likeness differs of necessity from what it represents. If it did not, it would be what it represents, and thus not a representation. The only truly false representation is the belief in the possibility of true representation. Critique is not a solution, but the problem itself. Critique is a police action in representation, of service only to the maintenance of the value of property through the establishment of its value.
45. The politics of representation is always the politics of the state. The state is nothing but the policing of representation's adequacy to the body of what it represents. Even in its most radical form, the politics of representation always presupposes an abstract or ideal state that would act as guarantor of its chosen representations. It yearns for a state that would recognise this oppressed ethnicity, or sexuality, but which is nevertheless still a desire for a state, and a state that, in the process, is not challenged as an statement of class interest, but is accepted as the judge of representation.
46. And always, what is excluded even from this enlightened, imaginary state, would be those who refuse representation, namely, the hacker class as a class. To hack is to refuse representation, to make matters express themselves otherwise. To hack is always to produce a difference, if only a minute difference, in the production of information. To hack is to trouble the object or the subject, by transforming in some way the very process of production by which objects and subjects come into being and recognise each other by their representations.
47. The politics of information, of knowledge, advances not through a critical negation of false representations but a positive politics of the virtuality of statement. The inexhaustible surplus of statement is that aspect of information upon which the class interest of hackers depends. Hacking brings into existence the inexhaustible multiplicity of all codes, be they natural or social, programmed or poetic. But as it is the act of hacking that composes, at one and the same time, the hacker and the hack, hacking recognises no artificial scarcity, no official licence, no credentialing police force other than that composed by the gift economy among hackers themselves.
48. A politics that embraces its existence as statement, as affirmative difference, not as negation can escape the politics of the state. To ignore or plagiarise representation, to refuse to give it what it claims as its due, is to begin a politics of statelessness. A politics which refuses the state's authority to authorise what is a valued statement and what isn't. A politics which is always temporary, always becoming something other than itself. Even useless hacks may come, perversely enough, to be valued for the purity of their uselessness. There is nothing that can't be valued as a representation. The hack always has to move on.
49. Everywhere dissatisfaction with representations is spreading. Sometimes its a matter of breaking a few shop windows, sometimes of breaking a few heads. So-called 'violence' against the state, which rarely amounts to more than throwing rocks at its police, is merely the desire for the state expressed in its masochistic form. Where some call for a state that recognises their representation, others call for a state that beats them to a pulp. Neither is a politics that escapes the desire cultivated within the subject by the educational apparatus.
50. Sometimes direct democracy is posited as the alternative. But this merely changes the moment of representation - it puts politics in the hands of claimants to an activist representation, in place of an electoral one.. Sometimes what is demanded of the politics of representation is that it recognise a new subject. Minorities of race, gender, preference demand the right to representation. But soon enough they discover the cost. They must now police the meaning of this representation, and police the adherence of its members to it. Even at its best, in its most abstract form, on its best behaviour, the colour blind, gender neutral, multicultural state just hands the value of representation over to the commodity form. While this is progress, particularly for those formerly oppressed by the state's failure to recognise their identity as legitimate, it stops short at the recognition of expressions of subjectivity that seeks to become something other than a representation that the state can recognise and the market can value.
51. But there is something else hovering on the horizon of the representable. There is a politics of the unrepresentable, a politics of the presentation of the non-negotiable demand. This is politics as the refusal of representation itself, not the politics of refusing this or that representation. A politics which, while abstract, is not utopian. In its infinite and limitless demand, it may even be the best way of extracting concessions precisely through its refusal to put a name - or a price - on what revolt desires.
Revolt
52. The revolts of 1989 are the signal events of our time. What the revolts of 1989 achieved was the overthrow of regimes so impervious to the recognition of the value of the hack that they had starved not only their hackers but also their workers and farmers of any increase in the surplus. With their cronyism and kleptocracy, their bureaucracy and ideology, their police and spies, they starved even their pastoralists and capitalists of innovative transformation and growth.
53. The revolts of 1989 overthrew boredom and necessity. At least for a time. They put back on the world historical agenda the limitless demand for free statement. At least for a time. They revealed the latent destiny of world history to express the pure virtuality of becoming. At least for a time, before new states cobbled themselves together and claimed legitimacy as representations of what revolt desired. The revolts of 1989 opened the portal to the virtual, but the states that regrouped around this opening soon closed it. What the revolts really achieved was the making of the world safe for vectoral power.
54. The so-called anti-globalisation protests of the 90s are a ripple caused by the wake of these signal events, but a ripple that did not know the current to which it truly belonged. This movement of revolt in the overdeveloped world identifies the rising vectoral power as a class enemy, but all too often it allowed itself to be captured by the partial and temporary interests of local capitalist and pastoralist classes. It was a revolt is in its infancy that has yet to discover the connection between its engine of limitless desire and free statement, and the art of making tactical demands.
55. The class struggle within nations and the imperial struggle between nations has taken shape as two forms of politics. One kind of politics is regressive. It seeks to return to an imagined past. It seeks to use national borders as a new wall, a neon screen behind which unlikely alliances might protect their existing interests in the name of a glorious past. The other form is the progressive politics of movement. The politics of movement seeks to accelerate toward an unknown future. It seeks to use international flows of information, trade or activism as the eclectic means for struggling for new sources of wealth or liberty that overcomes the limitations imposed by national coalitions.
56. Neither of these politics corresponds to the old notion of a left or right, which the revolutions of 1989 have definitively overcome. Regressive politics brings together luddite impulses from the left with racist and reactionary impulses from the right in an unholy alliance against new sources of power. Progressive politics rarely takes the form of an alliance, but constitutes two parallel processes locked in a dialogue of mutual suspicion, in which the liberalising forces of the right and the social justice and human rights forces of the left both seek non-national and transnational solutions to unblocking the system of power which still accumulates at the national level.
57. There is a third politics, which stands outside the alliances and compromises of the post-89 world. Where both progressive and regressive politics are representative politics, which deal with aggregate party alliances and interests, this third politics is a stateless politics, which seeks escape from politics as such. A politics of the hack, inventing relations outside of representation.
58. Expressive politics is a struggle against commodity property itself. Expressive politics is not the struggle to collectivise property, for that is still a form of property. Expressive politics is the struggle to free what can be free from both versions of the commodity form - its totalising market form, and its bureaucratic state form. What may be free from the commodity form altogether is not land, not capital, but information. All other forms of property are exclusive. The ownership by one excludes, by definition, the ownership by another. But information as property may be shared without diminishing anything but its scarcity. Information is that which can escape the commodity form.
59. Politics can become expressive only when it is a politics of freeing the virtuality of information. In liberating information from its objectification as a commodity, it liberates also the subjective force of statement. Subject and object meet each other outside of their mere lack of each other, by their desire merely for each other. Expressive politics does not seek to overthrow the existing society, or to reform its larger structures, or to preserve its structure so as to maintain an existing coalition of interests. It seeks to permeate existing states with a new state of existence, spreading the seeds of an alternative practice of everyday life.
lunes, 3 de septiembre de 2007
A HACKER MANIFESTO por McKenzie Wark
Publicado por
DARÍO YANCÁN
en
5:39
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Entrevista a McKenzie Wark por First Monday
Comentario previo
Dado que las expresiones del autor varian radicalmente al ser traducidas, he decidido su publicación en el idioma de origien, en pos de conservar la gramática, sintaxis y potencialidad expresiva de sus palabras y construcción ideomáticas. Sepan disfrutarlo.
Publicó para RECONSTRUYENDO EL PENSAMIENTO por Darío Yancán
This interview was conducted with First Monday’s Chief Editor Ed Valauskas, stimulated in part by A Hacker Manifesto.
First Monday (FM): In A Hacker Manifesto you write "Education is slavery. Education enchains the mind and makes it a resource for class power." If that is true, then as a professor at the New School University, should I really identify you as an "enslaver"? How do you envision your role as an "educator"?
McKenzie Wark (MW): I draw a distinction between education and knowledge. Knowledge is the practice of creating relatively stable islands of useful or interesting information, and it’s my belief that these should be available for everybody, and that everybody can work on creating and refining them.
Education is the term I use for turning the practice of knowledge into something that can be administered and commodified. I argue that turning knowledge into education by making it a product is a bad idea. It makes a process into a thing.
Of course, as a teacher in a private college I’m living the contradiction. Students are always caught between buying school as a product and experiencing the pleasures of the free creation of knowledge.
The New School, where I work, was founded by John Dewey (among others), who were very much alive to this tension, I think. The New School started as adult education in New York’s East village. Another part of its story is the University in Exile, which saved Hannah Arendt and many others from the Nazis. So I’ve landed in an institution that is all about thinking and working in this tension between the process of knowledge as free creation and external powers of market and state that distort it in their own own image.
FM: There are repeated references in A Hacker Manifesto to "crypto–Marxists." In one your footnotes you call Marx a "crypto–Marxist." Can you explain "crypto–Marxism"? Is A Hacker Manifesto a crypto–Marxist work? If so, are true hackers "crypto–Marxists"?
One can take Marx as the source–code for a kind of "ruthless criticism of all that exists," as he put it. But of course you have to turn this critical code against Marxists as well. I think the interesting writers who try to take on the whole world are doing this — using Marx against himself. Guy Debord, Felix Guattari, or Toni Negri for example. I use them in the book too. And of course I try to turn them against themselves as well.
I wanted to find a way of writing that took its distance from consensus reality in a critical way, but I didn’t want it to be about "resistance" to the emerging neo–liberal world order, where all information is privatized. I wanted an affirmative book that offered a new kind of social imagination. I think it’s useful to be able to imagine the world otherwise. Readers may not like my particular alternative world, but I hope the book can lead you toward your own acts of speculative thought.
Would you agree?
Each stage is an enclosure of the commons in favor of a private property right. Intellectual property grows out of patent, trademark, and copyright but changes them from a kind of social compromise to a private property right.
Each stage produces a class who own the means of production in the form of private property, and a class dispossessed of what it produces in the first place. Thus we get farmers versus landlords, workers versus capitalists, and as I would put it, a new level of class conflict, between hackers and what I call vectoralists — those who own intellectual property and the vectors which are the means of realizing its value.
I see the formation of a hacker sensibility and ethic as an expression of this new level of conflict over the enclosure of the commons and the subordination of free productivity to the commodity form. So I see Gisle Hannemyr’s story as part of a bigger picture. Intellectual property makes all kinds of creativity equivalent in the eyes of the marketplace. So x amount of your patents are worth y amount of my copyrights.
So while writers, programmers, biologists, or musicians tend to see themselves as separate cultures with specialized ways of thinking, I think there is an over–arching class interest there as well. An interest in preserving the autonomy of the way we labor that farmers and workers have already lost. We are the new front line in a very long struggle.
It was instructive to see how the U.S. Supreme Court responded to Professor Lessig’s brief about the constitutional limits to copyright. He seems to think that the courts can act as a neutral arbiter in the interests of the common good. I take the view that the courts represent the ruling interests.
And those ruling interests are changing. The capitalist ruling class was not so concerned with turning information into an absolute property right, as it was incidental to their interests. So research, education, and culture could be left to the state and managed in the interests of the economy as a whole.
But the emerging vectoralist class is not interested in the power of the machine, in manufacturing. It’s quite happy to outsource all that to a mass of competitive bidders in the developing world. It controls the production process by controlling information as property — and demands more and more that the state police this right.
I think we need to confront this emerging power with a range of tactics, of which Creative Commons is one, the Free Software movement is another. The struggle over generic drugs, particularly for the developing world is yet another front. Tools for free knowledge and communication sharing — nettime, First Monday — that’s also part of it.
Another part is the rampant file swapping that ordinary people have initiated. I think that’s a whole social movement. And just as it took the threat of communism to get social democracy, I think it will take the threat of a radical experiment in free information to arrive at some negotiated settlement of a "commons."
So while Creative Commons might be a model of the goal, it is one tactic among many.
And so: "information wants to be free" (Stewart Brand) ... "but is everywhere in chains" (Jean–Jacques Rousseau). We have to put the politics back into thinking about the information economy.
Do hackers and their activities represent a response to these "planetary business giants"? Will hackers be "impotent" eventually in this struggle, if indeed there is a struggle?
There are qualitative differences, however, in how the commodity economy works in different stages. I think there’s a real, slow motion revolution that spills out from the invention of the telegraph and culminates in the so–called "new economy." The telegraph, or what I call telesthesia — perception at a distance — makes information move faster than people or things. You can produce a kind of doubling of the world. You create a space of information in which to manage and direct the movement of things.
From the telegraph to the telephone to television to today’s emerging digital media vectors, what gets produced is a "third nature." The built environment, with its roads and buildings, its factories and farms is a second nature, a transformation of nature by collective labor into something more habitable. But this second nature produces its own internal contradictions. And so a third nature arises through which to try and resolve those contradictions. Each is a more abstract phase of development than the last.
And as history pursues this strategy of abstraction, it becomes more and more dependent on hackers — creators of new forms of abstraction — to push further and further towards a third nature of information flow that maps and monitors and transforms the world.
Third nature has utopian possibilities, but it could end up being subordinated to merely reproducing and expanding the commodity economy. This would be the attempt to solve the contradictions of the commodity economy by making more of the same. or, it could be a step towards new forms of organization in which information plays a new role.
The thing about information is that it really does want to be free. It knows no "natural" scarcity. It can escape the commodity economy, at least in part. That’s where hacking — in every sense of the word — has a unique role to play. It’s creating the possibility that something — even if it is only information — can be freed from scarcity and hence from the commodity economy.
The challenge is to think the coming of the digital — computing broadly conceived — as revolutionary. But to think it as not just a technology, but a whole social transformation, and to pay attention to its uneven development, and to local cultural specificities.
One way to go is to deal only with the local and get it really right. There’s a role for that kind of specialized scholarship. But I think there is also a role for trying to synthesize that work into a worldview.
A good work of scholarship is going to strongly true about a limited world. A good work of theory is going to be slightly true about a very big chunk of the world. In A Hacker Manifesto I’m trying to do the latter. Readers can choose to measure it against their local experience however they want. Like any good theory it is refutable. I just hope it would be a productive contribution to knowledge even if people refuted everything in it. Maybe that’s a way to create a better worldview.
We may never approach "maximal knowledge" of the entire contents of the Internet, with some eight billion Web pages in existence, or an average of 1.25 Web pages per person on the planet. Or will we?
My interest is in praxis — in the relationship of knowledge to action. I wrote A Hacker Manifesto as a synethsis of everything I’ve learned about the free creation and sharing of knowledge, from some 10 years of trying to practice it in various digital gift economies on the Internet. So it doesn’t try to "cover" everything. Knowledge for me is subtractive. It’s about what you leave out. It’s about compressing it down to the smallest file size that is still useful. Life is too short for long books.
John McDermott wrote in the New York Review of Books [
"If religion was formerly the opiate of the masses, then surely technology is the opiate of the educated public today, or at least its favorite authors. No other single subject is so universally invested with high hopes for the improvement of mankind generally and of Americans in particular."
So if technology is the opiate, what role do hackers play for the "masses"?
I think we have to change the discourse a bit, and lock onto the commodification of technology, the exploitation of technology as ways of making money rather than as ways of building new possibilities for being human. That’s why I write that "OpiumTM is the religion of the people," refering to a line of designer perfume. Commodification is no longer about things, it’s about signs. The material aspect of the commodity is being hollowed out. Now it’s just a support for the brand.
But hackers can also free information from any particular material form. That’s the genius of digital technology. It provides a platform where information has an arbitrary relation to the material. You could copy this interview onto your hard disk and 999 times out of 1000 you will have exactly the same thing. That’s a tremendously liberating potential. It can free information from scarcity — were it not for a commodity system that keeps trying to stuff it back into material things by legal or technical means. You can be damned sure the next generation DVDs will be much harder to rip than the last, for example. and that’s a backward step, trapping information rather than freeing it.
I argue that the term "hackers," in the broad sense, includes anyone who is a custodian of the virtual, anyone who works on charting the virtual and bringing things into existence, ranging from science to poetry. I think all of us who try to live up to that goal have a shared sense that it is — or can be — a good thing.
I don’t offer a program so much as an orientation: think about what you have as a common interest with other producers of information, and beyond that with other producers in general. Think beyond the property form. Imagine new worlds where information not only wants to be free, but is free. I think that’s a whole new horizon for thinking about what justice is, for what the just society could be.
1. See http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_2/gisle/.
2. At http://mondediplo.com/1998/06/01leader.
3. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN015092.pdf.
4. E. Schrodinger, 1935. "Die gegenwartige Situation in der Quantenmechanik," Naturwissenschaftern, volume 23, pp. 807–812; pp. 823–823; and, pp. 844–849; English translation by John D. Trimmer in 1980 in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, volume 124, pp. 323–338.
5. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/11253.
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"La resistencia como obligación" por Darío Yancán
Quizás podría plantearme que he hecho de la resistencia un culto, pagano, permanente, que me incomoda a diario haciéndome un ser antisocial.
Es probable que me haya transformado en un inadaptado, en un subversivo que aún circula en libertad. En algunos momentos, creo que la invasión que hizo la resistencia sobre mi cuerpo, es de tal magnitud que hasta repele la enfermedad.
Por eso me resisto a morir de un simple cáncer, de una simple neumonía o simplemente de aids, y tengo la esperanza de que mi muerte, el día que me llegue, sea lo más estética posible, sea presentable y consensuada.
Me resisto a aceptar, a la actitud pasiva y tranquilizante de dividir el mundo en dos, en ellos y nosotros.
Me resisto a ser políticamente correcto y a ser conveniente hasta tal punto que me impida poder ver y vociferar que el mundo está manejado un capital que mata. Un capital que ya no tiene excusas y un mercado que no reparte ni contiene.
Me resisto a los Dioses que se apoltronan en sus templos e iglesias, que dan consuelo a los Ejércitos y especialmente, a aquel que dio de alta al ex alcohólico que siembra de bombas el mundo.
Me resisto a la agradabilidad debida, a la sonrisa por conveniencia y al deber ser.
Me resisto a la inmemoria y al olvido, a que el humano funeral concluya en saber los restos en reposo y el espíritu sereno, resisto pensar que la paz eterna se alcanza con un ramillete de flores.
Me resisto al consuelo, a la palmada cálida y al entender que ciertos acontecimientos son inexorables.
Me resisto al perdón y a la fe, a poner la otra mejilla, a ver en mi verdugo y explotador, a un hermano confundido digno de ser redimido por medio de la confesión y el sacramento.
Me resisto a la Ley y a la Legislación que discrimina y resguarda sectores de impunidad y privilegio. Al discurso de la igualdad de todos los Hombres ante la Ley como una condición natural de la sociedad. Me resisto a su violencia coercitiva y a su condición de amenaza velada.
Me resisto a los daños. Sobre todo a los colaterales que manejan su recuento victimario en base a la unidad de mil, mientras que otros daños cuentan simplemente por unidad. Me resisto a la donación de sangre forzosa para riego de la tierra, extraída a fuerza de bombardeo.
Me resisto a que una foca o una ballena valgan más empeño en ser salvadas que los niños iraquíes, agfanos, kosovares, argentos o brasileros.
Me resisto al encuadre psicoanalítico y a la función correspondiente, a la previsibilidad y al destino marcado.
Me resisto a las funciones meramente biológicas: respirar, comer, cagar, coger, consumir, aceptar, mirar, y todas aquellas actitudes que me aseguren un confort para “el buen vivir”.
Me resisto a adaptarme a la realidad. Algún día pasado, no recuerdo bien cuanto hace pero, creo que es anterior a la existencia misma de esta Republiqueta, o no?, un hábil esgrimista del discurso dijo: “LA ÚNICA VERDAD ES LA REALIDAD”[1]. Y vaya que signó el imaginario político. Vaya que se reprodujo hasta el hartazgo en nuestra politiquería barata. Desconoció e hizo desconocer la parte que involucra a la realidad como construcción social consensuada y en disputa.
Me resisto a ofrecerle hijos a este mundo, a ofrecerle hijos que miren TV o que festejen su cumpleaños en McDonald o en Disneylandia.
Me resisto a aceptarlos pisando los países y mascando chicle.
Me resisto a lo que me cuentan como inevitable, al discurso que nos diseminan los medios que la Democracia es el mejor sistema posible, n tanto ésta sea vehículo de inequidades.
Me resisto a pensar la resistencia como un acto inhumano.
A todo esto no tengo opción, no puedo no ver que en cada semáforo de cualquiera de nuestro países los niños resto que le sobran a nuestras sociedades tercermundistas, no ver las gentes que con el atardecer aparecen como zombis de detrás de cualquier recodo de la ciudad a recorrerla juntado sus despojos. No tengo opción más que la resistencia para seguir conservando rasgos de humanidad, para conservar la virtud de conmoverme con el dolor ajeno.
Lamento complicaros la existencia pero para concluir, no tengo más que un reparto de compromisos. Ustedes andan, circulan, ven, entienden, algunos estarán dotados de sensibilidad, nos guste o no, con un mínimo raciocinio contamos.
Así que estamos encrucijados, aceptamos o resistimos?.
Decimos a todo que si o nos asalta una obligación. Nos asalta la resistencia como obligación. Es una encrucijada simple, es tan sólo por SI o por NO. Es tu decisión.
[1] La frase pertenece al Tte. Gral. Juan Domingo Perón.
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Privatización del Ejército norteamericano" por Carlos Fresneda y Pablo Pardo
Aseguran que muchos de los extranjeros en Irak, a los que Estados Unidos llama “contratistas”, son “guerreros privados” al servicio del Pentágono en la lucha contra la resistencia.La Convención de Ginebra prohíbe el uso de “personas reclutadas para un conflicto armado por un país distinto del suyo y motivado por la ganancia personal”. Pese a ello, Estados Unidos no ha dudado en recurrir a las Corporaciones Militares Privadas durante la ocupación de Irak. Estas empresas están suplantando las funciones del Ejército norteamericano hasta límites alarmantes. Se calcula que en Irak puede haber hasta 20.000 hombres de este “ejército invisible” que trabaja para el Pentágono.
“Todo lo que sabemos de él es que era colombiano y que murió acribillado en Tikrit. Viajaba en un convoy militar, pero no era un soldado, sino un contratista”. ¿Y qué hace un “contratista” colombiano trabajando para Kellogg, Brown & Root, la primera gran beneficiaria del Ejército norteamericano en Irak? Nunca lo sabremos. Tampoco nos dan su nombre, “por razones de seguridad”. Kellogg, Brown & Root, la misma compañía que impulsó la privatización del Ejército norteamericano y que ahora está sufriendo en sus carnes los ataques de la guerrilla iraquí, tiene por norma no identificar a sus “bajas de guerra” ni revelar su misión exacta.
Más de 20 “contratistas” han muerto desde que arrancó la guerra. Todos ellos trabajaban para alguna de esas empresas de nuevo cuño, las Corporaciones Militares Privadas (CMP), que están suplantando poco a poco a los soldados. Ellos defienden su labor en aras de la “eficiencia” y de los requisitos de las guerras modernas. Muchos les ven simplemente como los mercenarios del siglo XXI.
Los nuevos guerreros privados llevan más de 10 años tomando posiciones, pero es ahora cuando empiezan a salir de las sombras. Se calcula que en Irak puede haber de 10.000 a 20.000 en estos momentos, aunque el secretismo del Pentágono y de sus compañías hermanas tienen a todos los expertos haciendo cábalas.
Se sabe, por ejemplo, que una sola compañía, Global Risk, tiene a mil cien hombres y ocupa el sexto lugar entre las potencias de la coalición, justo entre Italia y España. Entre los guerreros privadísimos de Global Risk hay decenas de ex soldados gurkas, conocidos precisamente por su fiereza en la batalla.
Irak se está convirtiendo en el campo de batalla de las Corporaciones Militares Privadas (CMP), con su particulares ejércitos paralelos, nutridos por miles de ex militares.
Ahí tenemos a los hombres de Vinnell, con años de experiencia adiestrando a la Guardia Nacional de Arabia Saudí. Y a los expertos militares de DynCorp, curtidos en la lucha contra la guerrilla en Colombia, y beneficiados ahora por un contrato de 40 millones de dólares para preparar a la policía de Irak. Y a los aguerridos expertos de Recursos Militares Sociedad Anónima (MPRI, Inc.), capitaneados por el ex general Carl Vuono, veterano de la primera Guerra del Golfo.
Hace 12 años, sin ir más lejos, la proporción entre contratistas y soldados era de uno a cien. En Irak, ahora mismo, se estima que puede haber un “contratista” por cada seis o diez soldados.
Muchas bombas han caído desde que el propio Dick Cheney, secretario de Defensa con Bush padre como presidente, encargara el primer estudio para impulsar la privatización del Ejército. Aquel informe fue elaborado precisamente por Brown & Root (filial de Halliburton, que luego dirigiría él mismo) y llegó a la conclusión de que era mucho más efectivo y barato ceder el trabajo sucio del Ejército a los “contratistas”.
Hoy por hoy, una tercera parte de las funciones del Ejército norteamericano está en manos privadas (incluido el mantenimiento y el manejo del Air Force One, el avión presidencial). La Administración Bush confía en seguir regalando pedazos de la torta bélica a los “contratistas”, hasta dejar la proporción en mitad y mitad.
Las Corporaciones Militares Privadas, en plena “guerra contra el terror”, son uno de los sectores industriales más prósperos de Estados Unidos y están creciendo más de prisa incluso que las empresas de Internet o de biotecnología.
Según Peter Singer, analista del centro de estudios Brookings Institution y autor del libro Corporate Warriors (Guerreros Corportativos), las CMP ya generan en todo el mundo una cifra de negocio de 100.000 millones de dólares. Para el 2010, los ingresos previstos alcanzarán los 200.000 millones.
Estos mercenarios posmodernos no tienen nada que ver con sus precursores de los años 60 y 70, que se movían en el borde de la legalidad cuando se iban a Biafra o al Congo a pegar tiros y leían la revista Soldier of Fortune (Soldado de Fortuna). Ahora se trata de un sector tan profesional como cualquier otro, protegido por el escudo de las grandes corporaciones y amparado por un vacío legal que nadie parece interesado en subsanar.
La Convención de Ginebra, artículo 47, prohíbe el uso de mercenarios y los define como “aquellas personas reclutadas para un conflicto armado por un país distinto del suyo y motivado por la ganancia personal”.
Las Corporaciones Militares Privadas no ocultan su afán de lucro, aunque rechazan la acusación de mercenarios. Gran parte de los contratistas, sin embargo, son ex militares que deciden incluso abandonar el Ejército de su país para ponerse el uniforme de guerrero empresarial.
Un miembro del cuerpo de elite SAS, del Ejército británico, recibirá el doble del salario si cuelga el uniforme y se va a una empresa privada. Un gurka especializado en misiones de alto riesgo será también una pieza codiciada de las empresas que se ofrecen para “operaciones tácticas”.
Las CMP están además empotradas en multinacionales que han empezado a olerse el negocio, desde Halliburton (propietaria de Kellog, Brown &Root) a L-3 Comunicaciones (que adquirió MPRI Inc.)
En marzo pasado, los dueños de DynCorp la vendieron por 950 millones de dólares a CSC, uno de los mayores proveedores de sistemas de comunicaciones del Pentágono (y, de paso, dueño del equipo ciclista del mismo nombre, que entrena a Bjarne Rijs, el corredor que impidió que Indurain ganara el Tour en 1995).
La maraña de las CMP se ha extendido también por el sistema político, y ahí tenemos a su mentor Dick Cheney, instalado como vicepresidente en la Casa Blanca. Tan sólo en 2001, las compañías militares privadas gastaron 32 millones de dólares en grupos de presión en Washington, con notables conexiones tanto con el Partido Republicano como con el Partido Demócrata.
La opinión pública norteamericana ha empezado a contraatacar con campañas como Stop the War Profiteers (Parar a los que se benefician de las guerras), pero el tema sigue siendo tabú en los grandes medios y en el Capitolio. La congresista demócrata Jan Schakowsky ha sido la única en levantar la voz contra la privatización de la guerra. “No existe ningún modo de controlar a estas empresas que actúan por cuenta propia”, ha denunciado Schakowsky. “Por un lado son empresas civiles, y por otra parte empresas militares, pero sus empleados no están sometidos al código militar y funcionan en una especie de limbo legal”.
La misma preocupación transmite Laura Peterson, analista del Centro por la Integridad Pública y autora del informe Making a Killing: the Business of War (Haciendo un asesinato: el negocio de la guerra). “No hay ninguna agencia del Gobierno ni ningún organismo internacional que vigile a estas empresas”, denuncia Peterson. “Es imposible tener una idea exacta de ellas, saber cómo funcionan, cómo son los mecanismos de licitación y cuáles son las condiciones impuestas a los contratistas militares”.
Para mejorar su imagen pública, una docena de empresas han unido fuerzas en la así llamada Asociación Internacional para las Operaciones de Paz. Según su director, Doug Brooks, no se trata de despistar ni de lavar la imagen de las controvertidas corporaciones militares. “La paz y la estabilidad son siempre más rentables que las guerras”, afirma Brooks. “Pero las guerras existen, y nosotros salimos al encuentro de unas necesidades que están ahí”.
El mayor intento de arrojar luz sobre este ejército transnacional, invisible y paralelo que está desplegado ya en 50 países acaba de hacerlo Peter Singer con su libro Corporate Warriors. “Tanto las corporaciones militares como los gobiernos democráticos tienen que entender que no se pueden seguir camuflando”, afirma Singer. El autor adopta una posición neutral en el tema y acusa incluso a la ONU de doble rasero: “Por un lado critican la labor de estas empresas, pero por otro lado las utilizan como apoyo en misiones de paz”. “Tenemos que partir del hecho de que vivimos en un mundo donde hay guerras”, añade Singer. “Y estas empresas, que no son ni buenas ni malas en sí mismas, salen al encuentro de necesidades creadas por estas guerras. Otra cosa es el factor moral. Hay gente que piensa que los ejércitos nunca se deben privatizar, y que es injusto que haya quien se beneficie de las guerras”. Singer le da la vuelta al viejo axioma y proclama, a modo de conclusión del libro: “Aun así, la guerra es una cosa muy importante como para dejarla en manos de las empresas. Necesitamos más transparencia y leyes que pongan coto de alguna manera a estas empresas, que hoy por hoy se mueven en un terreno muy ambiguo y cruzan la frontera con bastante frecuencia”.
“La situación sobre el terreno es complicada”, ha explicado a este periódico un ex soldado americano que trabaja a tiempo parcial en SAIC (Science Aplicatios International Company), otra de estas empresas. “Ahora estamos entrenando a policías en Irak. Eso implica salir con ellos de patrulla. Y entonces, podemos ser atacados. Así que tenemos que tomar medidas para defendernos”.
Northrop Grumman también es dueño de otro de los líderes del sector, Vinnell, una empresa que está pujando por el contrato para el mantenimiento de dos bases de uso conjunto de España y EEUU. Vinnell ha puesto anuncios en EEUU pidiendo, entre otras cosas, ex oficiales del Ejército y los Marines —desde tenientes hasta tenientes coroneles—, “en buena condición física” para entrenar a los reclutas iraquíes.
Ahora, con la guerra de Irak, todo el sector vive una edad de oro. La Administración Bush está subcontratando gran parte de las funciones que tradicionalmente han llevado a cabo las Fuerzas Armadas. Por ejemplo, cuestiones tan básicas como la entrega de correo o incluso la distribución y reparto de alimentos a los 130.000 soldados americanos en Irak corren a cargo de Kellog, Brown & Root (KBR).
Pero en Irak es precisamente donde la actuación de las CMP ha empezado a ser puesta en cuestión. Según muchos militares, la guerra privatizada no es una buena idea. La evaluación ofensiva terrestre llevada a cabo por la Tercera División de Infantería —la que tomó Bagdad— incluye quejas por la tardanza de KBR en entregar el correo. Otros soldados han criticado la pésima comida que les ha dado Halliburton. Finalmente, la empresa texana ha sido acusada de cobrar 2,65 dólares por cada galón —unos cuatro litros— de petróleo que transporta de Kuwait a Irak, cuando el Ejército lo hace por un dólar.
Otros no lo ven de forma tan negativa. “En Irak ha habido un problema básico: el Pentágono ha llamado a los contratistas privados demasiado pronto. El resultado es que están en medio de una situación de combate”
Guerreros privados sin frontera
En la última década, las Corporaciones Militares Privadas se han visto envueltas en numerosos incidentes en diversas partes del planeta. Hoy por hoy, sus efectivos están desplegados en unos 50 países, principalmente en Africa Central, Oriente Medio, Sureste Asiático, Sudamérica y los Balcanes. A veces son contratadas por los gobiernos locales para adiestrar a sus ejércitos; otras se limitan a prestar apoyo técnico a los ejércitos norteamericano y británico. En varias ocasiones han cruzado sin embargo la línea y se han implicado en misiones propias de soldados. El secretismo que las rodea ha servido para mitigar el efecto de esta serie concatenada de noticias sin fronteras.Croacia: El 4 de agosto de 1995, el Ejército de Croacia lanzó la ofensiva para recuperar la Krajina, una extensa franja de ese país ocupada por los serbobosnios. Los croatas retomaron todo el territorio en apenas tres días en una ofensiva bautizada como Operación Tormenta, en la que cometieron ejecuciones sumarias, bombardeos indiscriminados y limpieza étnica.
El ejército croata había sido adiestrado durante meses por una empresa americana cuyo nombre deja lugar a pocas dudas: Recursos Militares Profesiones (MPRI). La compañía está dirigida por el ex general de dos estrellas Carl E. Vuono, veterano de la Guerra del Golfo, frente a un equipo de otros 19 ex militares norteamericanos.
Ninguno de ellos había realizado ese trabajo por orden del Pentágono. Era, simplemente, un contrato de consultoría de su empresa, que en 1994 consiguió la licencia del Departamento de Estado para entrenar al ejército croata. MPRI ha negado reiteradamente su participación directa en la Operación Tormenta (bautizada al más puro estilo americano) y ha sostenido que su labor consistió únicamente en preparar técnicamente al ejército croata.
Los analistas reconocen que la ofensiva fue el punto de inflexión en la guerra contra Serbia. La otra cara de la moneda es ésta: la ofensiva rompió el alto el fuego de Naciones Unidas, causó 170.000 refugiados y provocó una nueva limpieza étnica. Los comandantes croatas que dirigieron la operación han sido procesados por el Tribunal Internacional de Crímenes de Guerra.
Bosnia: Varios empleados de DynCorp, otra de las empresas punteras del sector militar privado, se vieron implicados en un escándalo de tráfico sexual, prostitución de menores y tráfico ilegal de armas en Bosnia. Según Peter Singer, autor de Corporate Warriors, el supervisor de DynCorp en Bosnia grabó un vídeo de sí mismo violando a dos jóvenes. Nadie fue procesado por el caso. Para que escapara a las autoridades locales, los empleados fueron sacados del país.
Kosovo: En 1999, tras los bombardeos contra Serbia, Estados Unidos se hizo con un terreno de cientos de hectáreas en una zona rural de Urosevac, en el sureste de Kosovo. En cuatro meses, la compañía Kellog, Brown & Root levantó la mayor base militar norteamericana construida desde la época del Vietnam.
Cuatro años después, mil norteamericanos y siete mil albaneses trabajan en la base, situada nada casualmente en la ruta del futuro oleoducto trasbalcánico AMBO. El estudio de viabilidad del oleoducto fue realizado en 1996 (y actualizado en el año 2000) por la misma compañía que construyó la base militar: Kellog, Brown & Root, subsidiaria de Halliburton, la empresa que dirigió en su día el vicepresidente Dick Cheney.
Colombia: Es el escenario de una de las primeras y más ostensibles guerras privatizadas de la última década. El Gobierno de EE. UU. ha evitado implicar a sus efectivos en misiones de combate, pero los soldados de compañías como DynCorp llevan tiempo ejerciendo ese papel y se han ganado —según Peter Singer— la reputación de “arrogantes y dispuestos a luchar”.
Africa: Con su serie inacabable de conflictos de baja intensidad, este continente es un campo abonado para las compañías privadas militares. Aunque en algunas ocasiones el Departamento de Estado ha denegado la licencia a algunos contratistas que pretendían adiestrar ejércitos en regímenes dictatoriales. MPRI ha conseguido contratos en Guinea Ecuatorial y en Nigeria. En 1996 firmó un contrato de 60 millones de dólares con el Gobierno de Angola, donde han llegado a trabajar hasta 80 compañías militares y de seguridad privadas.
Executive Outcomes (EO), con experiencia en la propia Angola, en Sierra Leona, en Ruanda y en el Congo, es una de las compañías líderes del sector en Sudáfrica, el tercer exportador de servicios militares, tras Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña.
Afganistán: La CIA da una nueva vuelta de tuerca en la privatización de la guerra y pone parcialmente en manos de contratistas particulares los vuelos de sus aviones Predator durante la campaña de Afganistán.
Una vez acabada la guerra, la empresa DynCorp —la que vela por el mantenimiento del Air Force One— consigue el contrato para la protección privada del presidente afgano Hamid Krzai. Su siguiente misión será entrenar al Ejército afgano una vez que los Boinas Verdes abandonen el país.
Kuwait: Decenas de contratistas armados participan en cursos de adiestramiento del Ejército local en la estratégica base de Camp Doha.
Arabia Saudita: El 12 de mayo, poco después de que el presidente George W. Bush diera por concluidos los combates en Irak, un atentado suicida de Al Qaeda se cobra 34 víctima (ocho de ellas norteamericanas) en Riad. Uno de los objetivos de los terroristas fue el bloque de viviendas donde vivían 70 empleados de Vinnell.
Vinnell, creada en 1975 por ex militares americanos, es la responsable del adiestramiento de la Guardia Nacional. Desde la Guerra del Golfo, el Gobierno saudí ha puesto millones de dólares en las manos de compañías militares privadas norteamericanas.
Gaza: Tres guardias de seguridad norteamericanos que protegían al agregado de Cultura de la embajada en Tel Aviv, mueren al hacer explosión una bomba en Gaza.
Irak: Un contratista de Kellog, Brown & Root que viajaba empotrado en un convoy militar en Irak muere al estallar una mina a su paso en agosto pasado en las cercanías de Tikrit. El 30 de noviembre, un día después de la muerte de los siete espías españoles, fallece tiroteado, también en Tikrit, un contratista colombiano de la misma Kellog, Brown & Root, que se niega a facilitar su nombre y su cometido exacto “por razones de seguridad”.
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"El fenómeno de los soldados contratados" por Christian Riavale
Son la principal fuerza armada en Irak y hasta empezarían a actuar en Rusia. Ex militares y agentes de seguridad de EE.UU., Gran Bretaña, Nepal, Fidji y Sudáfrica, integran esta renovada mano de obra de un negocio que genera ingresos por 100 mil millones de dólares. Las empresas más importantes. Dónde actúan. Una flamante coalición para facturar. 
Los diputados rusos levantaron la mano y –como si fuera un caso de rutina– autorizaron al coloso energético Gazprom a crear un servicio privado de seguridad “dotado de las mismas prerrogativas que tienen el ejército y la policía” de Rusia. La ley, que todavía debe ser aprobada por la Cámara alta y firmada por el presidente Vladimir Putin, faculta a esas fuezas paramilitares a utilizar “equipamientos especiales” para proteger las refinerías y los 153.000 km de gasoductos que posee Gazprom a través de su filial Transneft.
Esa decisión –que pasó totalmente inadvertida– puso de relieve la creciente importancia que tienen las milicias privadas y el desarrollo que alcanzó esa industria en el mundo.
El ejemplo más elocuente de ese fenómeno es la Guerra de Irak, donde la cantidad de profesionales a sueldo de las compañías militares privadas (CMP) es superior al número de combatientes: actualmente hay 180.000 civiles de todas las nacionalidades trabajando bajo contrato privado contra 160.000 militares, según cifras confirmadas por el Departamento de Estado y el de Defensa de Estados Unidos. Eso significa que ahora los “mercenarios” son la primera fuerza en Irak, delante de los contingentes de Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña.
Muchos. Habitualmente, se habla de 60.000 extranjeros contratados por las CMP. Esa cifra sólo contabiliza los 21.000 norteamericanos y otros 43.000 extranjeros que trabajan en Irak. Pero la legión de contratados incluye también 118.000 iraquíes.
Todos esos empleados que trabajan en la llamada industria de la protección armada (IPA) se dedican esencialmente a la custodia de personalidades, protección de infraestructuras (oleoductos, plantas de bombeo, antenas de comunicación), mantenimiento de sistemas de armas, vigilancia de instalaciones y edificios civiles, y operaciones subalternas de servicio (alimentación, limpieza, etc.).
“En Irak hay una nueva coalición de gente que cobra por sus servicios”, denunció Peter Singer, analista de la Brooking Institution, de Washington, y autor del libro Corporate Warrions: Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Combatientes privados: el surgimiento de la industria militar privatizada). “Esta ya no es una coalición de cooperación –precisó–, sino una coalición de facturación de servicios.”
Los contingentes más importantes de contratados son británicos, seguidos por gurkas de Nepal, ex militares de las islas Fidji –con gran experiencia, como Cascos Azules de la ONU–, sudafricanos, soldados de la ex Yugoslavia y ex miembros de las fuerzas armadas de Saddam Hussein. También hay unos 5.000 guardias de origen latinoamericano, procedentes –en particular– de Chile, Perú, Ecuador y Honduras.
Los profesionales contratados en Estados Unidos, Europa y Sudáfrica reciben salarios que oscilan entre 12.000 y 15.000 dólares mensuales más una fuerte indemnización para sus familias en caso de deceso provocado por un “accidente profesional” (DynCorp promete 160.000 dólares a sus empleados en caso de deceso). Los gurkas, en cambio, sólo cobran de 5.000 a 6.000 dólares y los latinoamericanos apenas reciben US$ 3.000 por mes. Las últimas contrataciones se hicieron incluso a 1.500 dólares. Los iraquíes, por su parte, apenas reciben 150 dólares.
La acción de esos contratados no se limita a participar en actividades logísticas. Los “mercenarios” extranjeros en Irak participan cada vez más en acciones de combate.
Esa “privatización de la guerra” quedó en evidencia por primera vez el 4 de abril de 2004, durante un incidente que causó estupefacción en todo el mundo: una multitud enardecida colgó de un puente sobre el Eufrates a cuatro norteamericanos contratados por Blackwater, la principal compañía militar privada del mundo. Más recientemente, un grupo inglés de protección tuvo que defenderse durante toda una noche dentro de un edificio atacado por milicias chiítas hasta que lograron llegar las tropas británicas.
A facturar. La privatización de la guerra en Irak, aunque parezca mentira, es apenas la parte visible del iceberg. Ese país en guerra, donde existe la mayor concentración militar del planeta, apenas representa el 25% de la facturación anual que realizan las CMP en todo el mundo. Los ingresos globales de la industria militar privada ascendieron a 100.000 millones de dólares en 2006, según una investigación del diario San Francisco Chronicle.
Actualmente, existen milicias privadas en Nigeria, Angola, Sierra Leona, Angola, Mozambique, República Democrática del Congo, Costa de Marfil, Liberia, Ruanda, Tayikistán, Armenia, Azerbaiyán, Croacia, Kosovo, Marruecos, en la mayoría de las monarquías petroleras del Golfo Pérsico y hasta en Cachemira, en la frontera entre Pakistán e India (ver mapa).
La aparición de estos corporate warriors corresponde a una “mutación estratégica del sistema unipolar actual”, según la definición acuñada por el peruano Enrique Bernales Ballesteros en el informe que realizó, a pedido de la ONU, sobre la proliferación de ejércitos privados en regiones en conflicto.
“La guerra del futuro será una guerra en free-lance, flexible y que puede estallar en cualquier lugar del mundo”, sostiene Singer, uno de los primeros que denunció los efectos perversos de la privatización de la guerra. Esa tendencia parece destinada a acentuarse en los próximos años. Estados Unidos prevé privatizar unos 250.000 puestos logísticos en sus fuerzas armadas.
Las “milicias privadas” –en Irak o en cualquier otro país– representan una solución para las grandes potencias, reacias a meter directamente los dedos en un engranaje que puede triturarles las manos.
“Los conflictos de baja intensidad son confiados, cada vez con mayor frecuencia, a firmas multinacionales de seguridad, sobre las cuales la comunidad internacional descarga su responsabilidad”, explica el francés Richard Banegas, profesor de Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad de la Sorbona.
“Las empresas de ese sector en plena expansión ofrecen servicios que van desde la simple vigilancia a las ‘guerras llave en mano’”, precisa.
Para diferenciarse de los mercenarios sin patria y sin bandera que combatieron en Africa en los años 60 y 70, estos comandos invocan una ética profesional que les impide participar en operaciones dudosas: “Nosotros no ayudamos a derrocar gobiernos, no somos el brazo armado de dictadores, no participamos en insurrecciones armadas, no hacemos tráfico de armas, no nos dedicamos a actividades terroristas y no queremos saber nada con la droga ni con materiales fisibles”, asegura el coronel Tim Spicer, héroe de las Malvinas en el ejército británico y experto de lucha antiterrorista en Irlanda.
Junto con unos veteranos sudafricanos de Executives Outcomes y un grupo de ex oficiales del SAS, Spicer fundó Sandline International, que ahora controla un imperio de 20 empresas de seguridad con representación en casi todo el mundo.
Rápidas. Esas empresas son capaces de movilizar en pocas horas hasta 8.000 hombres perfectamente entrenados, encuadrados por ex oficiales de unidades de elite de Francia, Gran Bretaña, Sudáfrica o Israel, y armados con material altamente sofisticado (helicópteros Mi-8, MI-17 y Mi-24, cazas Mig 2 y 27, cañones pesados, material infrarojo, etc.). En Bagdad, Blackwater –uno de los gigantes del sector– utiliza blindados, helicópteros y aviones.
Desde hace tiempo, esas empresas tienen filiales que se especializan en ofrecer escolta, protección y seguridad operativa a las ONG que operan en zonas de riesgo.
Las actividades humanitarias tienen la triple ventaja de ser un sector en plena expansión, de ofrecerles una buena imagen internacional y de abrirles vías privilegiadas de vinculación con las agencias de la ONU que organizan intervenciones masivas en zonas de emergencia (en guerra o víctimas de catástrofe naturales). Por ejemplo, Lifeguard –una filial de Sandline– fue elegida por la ONU para proteger sus instalaciones en Sierra Leona.
A veces, como ocurrió en Bosnia, las milicias privadas actúan subordinadas a los Cascos Azules de la Forpronu, y luego con las fuerzas de intervención enviadas por la OTAN y la Unión Europea. En esos casos, las Transnational Security Corporations, como se las llama en la jerga del Pentágono, trabajan bajo contrato firmado con los departamentos de Estado o de Defensa de Estados Unidos, la ONU, empresas privadas multinacionales o gobiernos.
En 1995, cuando comenzaron a apaciguarse los conflictos en la ex Yugoslavia, Croacia contrató a la empresa norteamericana Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) para que entrenara a sus fuerzas armadas.
El mayor problema reside en la dificultad para determinar dónde se encuentra la frontera entre las misiones defensivas de los subcontratistas privados y las operaciones de combate de los soldados regulares. Para adaptarse a ese nuevo fenómeno, el Pentágono inventó el concepto de “fuerza total”, que incluye soldados regulares, reservistas, subcontratistas privados y funcionarios civiles de defensa.
“La utilización de milicias privadas tiene la ventaja de que, cuando se producen bajas, pasan inadvertidas”, afirma John Geddes en su libro Autopista al infierno, donde describe su experiencia como mercenario en Irak.
Aunque teóricamente no están expuestas al fuego enemigo, en Irak las víctimas civiles acaban de llegar a 1.000, según The Washington Post. Pero esas bajas no suscitan ninguna reacción en Estados Unidos, donde sólo tiene repercusión política la contabilidad de militares muertos (casi 4.000).
Después de ver actuar a esos corporate warriors en escenarios de alto riesgo, algunos gobiernos empiezan a mirar con desconfianza a esas organizaciones –verdaderas multinacionales de la guerra– que algún día pueden escapar al control de sus contratistas.
¿Seguras?
Como resultado del vertiginoso incremento de la inseguridad urbana que se registró en los últimos años en todo el mundo, ese sector crece a un ritmo de 6 a 8 por ciento anual desde la década del 80. La industria privada de seguridad facturó 120.000 millones de dólares en 2006 en el mundo, según estadísticas de Freedonia Group Inc. Estados Unidos y Europa ocupan 75% de ese mercado, pero Asia (16%) y América latina (10%) son las dos regiones con más rápido crecimiento. Se estima que en 2015 Latinoamérica representará el 14% del mercado.
Los atentados de 2001 en Estados Unidos dieron un impulso decisivo al llamado mercado del miedo irracional que se tradujo en un incremento de las medidas de protección en estaciones, aeropuertos, subterráneos y edificios públicos. Las principales inversiones se concentraron en un refuerzo de todos los eslabones de la cadena de prevención del terrorismo y –simultáneamente– del delito: cámaras de control, vigilancia, alarmas, controles de acceso, sistemas antiincendio, cerrajería y monitoreo global.
En Estados Unidos, el crecimiento de la seguridad privada comienza a alcanzar proporciones inquietantes. Actualmente hay una proporción de 17 guardias privados armados por cada 10 policías. El mismo fenómeno existe en otros países de América latina. Eso plantea dos problemas: la claudicación del Estado en materia de seguridad y el surgimiento progresivo de zonas de “derecho privado” –como algunos countries– donde el reglamento interno prevalece de hecho sobre el Código Civil.
Otro peligro de ese fenómeno es que la codicia frente a las colosales sumas en juego pueda inducir a esas empresas a crear conflictos o amenazas artificiales a la seguridad para justificar su existencia y continuar multiplicando sus ganancias.
Blackwater, la número uno
Fundada en 1996 por el millonario cristiano conservador Erick Prince, Blackwater es seguramente la empresa militar privada más importante del mundo. Esa sociedad recibió un impulso decisivo para su crecimiento después de los atentados del 11 de septiembre de 2001 en Estados Unidos: gracias a los vínculos de Prince con el ala conservadora del Partido Republicano, Blackwater se convirtió en una pieza esencial de la guerra mundial contra el terrorismo.
En los últimos cinco años, la empresa ganó más de 1.200 millones de dólares en contratos públicos adjudicados sin licitación por organismos y agencias del gobierno (los departamentos de Estado y de Defensa, la CIA, la NSA, etc.).
Entrenados.
Blackwater posee un centro de entrenamiento de 3.500 hectáreas en Moyock (Carolina del Norte), considerado como la base militar privada más grande del mundo. Allí recibe a efectivos de los cuerpos militares de Estados Unidos para entrenarlos en tácticas especiales.
Actualmente, la empresa tiene 2.300 personas desplegadas en nueve países pero, en caso necesario, puede reunir otros 10.000 efectivos en pocas horas. Posee también una flota de más de 20 aparatos aéreos –incluyendo helicópteros de combate–, dirigibles de vigilancia, blindados para el transporte de tropas y armamento sofisticado.
En 2005, después del ciclón Katrina, envió fuerzas a Nueva Orleans para mantener el orden a un precio de 950 dólares diarios por hombre. En los momentos críticos, llegó a tener 600 efectivos entre Mississippi y Texas.
En Irak se ocupa de la seguridad de todos los funcionarios del Pentágono y del Departamento de Estado.
Los cuatro hombres de Blackwater que fueron colgados en un puente sobre el Eufrates le sirvieron como publicidad y le permitieron aumentar sus operaciones en Irak y en misiones de seguridad interior dentro de Estados Unidos.
Influyentes.
En su equipo dirigente figuran dos ex dirigentes clave del gobierno republicano: J. Cofer Black (ex jefe de contraterrorismo de la CIA) y Joseph Smith (ex inspector general del Pentágono). Uno de los integrantes de su staff de abogados es Kenneth Starr, que fue el fiscal en el caso Whitewater sobre presuntas malversaciones inmobiliarias de Bill y Hillary Clinton.
Actualmente, sus dirigentes emprendieron una intensa campaña de lobbying para reemplazar a las fuerzas federales en ciertas operaciones de seguridad dentro de Estados Unidos. Esa perspectiva amenaza con convertirla en una auténtica fuerza militar privada. En ese caso, ya no se trataría de una privatización de la guerra, sino de una privatización de la fuerza pública.
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